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In the broader context of deepening Russia-China political relations throughout the 1990s, mostly since 
the start of a “strategic partnership” in 1996, the economic linkages between the two countries have been 
largely considered “the weakest link” until very recently.1 Due to the widespread skepticism in Russia 
about the possibility that intensifying economic exchanges with China would lead to a dependence on 
what was then, already in the second half of the 1990s, expected to become a more successful economy 
in a short period of time, the Russian leaders refrained from deepening economic relations with China 
beyond the limited cooperation and exchanges that were planned by Moscow and Beijing after the 
establishment of the Russian Federation in 1992. This is why, throughout the 1990s, bold mutual 
ambitions to reach high levels of bilateral trade between the two countries went largely and invariably 
unmet, so that the value of total bilateral trade in 1999 was less than in 1992.2  
During the three decades that have almost passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and 
China significantly intensified their economic and trade relations, progressing from a “strategic 
partnership” to a treaty of “friendship and cooperation” signed in 2001. This was the result of both 
domestic and international factors. On the domestic side, Russia developed the need to build stronger 
sources of growth than energy exports to the West, who proved to be unreliable as an economic partner 
following the after-Ukraine sanctions. This led to major changes in the policy priorities of the Russian 
government, who had until then resisted the Chinese willingness to improve economic cooperation on 
the concern that this would head to an unbalanced relation to the benefit of China. Within the broader 
context of changing geopolitical conditions, Moscow progressively shifted its strategic focus from West 
to East: over less than a decade, the two countries managed to revitalize their once weak and troublesome 
economic partnership to such an extent that they are now the key players in a recently formed trading 
block covering most of the landmass across the Eurasian continent.  
After analysing the bilateral trade relations and structure though the 1990s, the chapter will focus on how 
the difficulties encountered by the two countries in building stronger economic relations came to an end 
through the following decade, increasingly since the mid 2000s, when bilateral economic ties started to 
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grow stronger, following institutional arrangements and agreements that have fostered a progressive 
improvement of economic cooperation and regional integration. Today China and Russia are major 
economic partners, linked together by increasing trade and investment linkages: in 2017, China-Russia 
trade rose 20.8 percent to more than 84 billion U.S. dollars, and by that time China had remained the 
largest trade partner of Russia for the eighth consecutive year.3 According to Chinese Customs data, in 
the first eight months of 2018, bilateral trade increased 25.7 percent year on year, well above China's 
overall foreign trade growth of 9.1 percent.4  
The ability to overcome the unfavourable framework in which bilateral economic relations were set at 
the times of the former USSR was the result of strong mutual commitment to advance bilateral economic 
cooperation. Besides bilateral relations, major regional cooperation arrangements have been signed that 
include both countries, most notably the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which includes Russia, 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, makes up all the landmass between china and the EU, it 
has a population of 183 million people with a gross domestic product of more than US$4 trillion, and 
has been growing at trade volume rates of 30 percent per annum. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) has recently included economic cooperation besides the more traditional aim of 
security cooperation. More recently, a number of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) were signed between 
the EAEU and a number of countries across Europe and Asia, including China are building a major 
trading area that extends from East Asia to the Eastern borders of Europe, from the Artic to India.  
The chapter will then turn to review the mounting speculations inspired by the progressive remaking of 
a Eurasian economic and trade block about the implications for the EU, in terms of EU relations with 
Russia, EU relations with China, EU relations with their partner countries and also for the EU overall 
economic security strategy. The widespread view, at least until the global financial crisis, that the world 
was organizing into three major trading regions – the Americas, Europe with Northern Africa, the Middle 
East and Russia, and Asia –  has proven largely divergent from the actual development of international 
trade relations. Since sanctions were imposed on Russia back in 2014, the country has been increasingly 
and deeply intertwining with China, not just through trade, but also investment, energy, transport, and 
now holds much deeper relations with China than with Europe, once Russia’s major historical economic 
partner. As trade usually brings cooperation and peace (as witnessed by the history of the EU), whereas 
difficult trade relations often lead to larger frictions in international affairs (as the world is now and again 
faced with as a result of the current US administration’s policy stance), some concluding remarks will 
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elaborate upon the need for securing positive trade relations with the new Eurasian trading region as a 
major policy priority for the EU. 
Difficult Russia-China trade relations in the 1990s 
The trade relations between the two biggest former command economies have always been rather 
cumbersome, since the establishment of the Russian Federation. The main reason for this is to be 
attributed to the fact that “trade between the Soviet Union and China consisted largely of a protocol 
trade consisting of bilateral contracts concluded between governmental structures”5, largely regulated on 
barter terms, and little room was given to the high complementarities in the two countries’ economic 
structures, which would naturally suggest a series of areas of mutually beneficial trade integration, namely 
technology, agricultural and energy cooperation. 
A number of other reasons were raised that were deemed responsible for the difficulties encountered by 
the two countries in building stronger economic relations, including the weakness of the Russian 
economy6, the lack of complementarity between the structure of the two economies, the widespread 
transportation bottlenecks and lack of connectivity between the two countries, the misalignment of policy 
priorities in the two countries and also some hostility in the Russian perception of the initial low quality 
of Chinese production and of an increasing Chinese influence to the possible detriment of domestic 
economic independence.7  
For all of the reasons above, bilateral trade between Russia and China remained at very low levels 
throughout the 1990s and until the early 2000s (Figure 1). During those years, Russia’s total trade with 
China was less than 2% of Russia’s total trade. Europe was a much bigger partner by far, with over $44 
billion exports in 1995 and over $72 billion in 2000, compared to $3.5 billion to China in 1995 and $5.2 
billion in 2000, according to data from Unctadstat8. Moreover, despite severe flaws in official trade data 
do not allow precise calculations, Russia run a trade surplus with China until 2004. During the 1990s, the 
commodity composition of Russian exports to China was similar to what it had been in the previous 
decades, with fertilisers, polymers of ethylene and telecommunication equipment being the largest 
exported items (Figure 2). Natural resources, namely oil and gas, were not yet the most important item 
in the bilateral trade structure, as they are today.  
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Figure 1. Russia-China trade since 1995 (mln USD) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from UNCTADStat 
 
The early 2000s marked an increase in the trade intensity between the two countries, and China became 
a major trade partner for Russia. In 2002 bilateral trade already exceeded that of Russia with Italy (once 
its largest trading partner) and the mid-2000s marked a significant shift in the bilateral trade balance as 
well as in the commodity composition of bilateral trade flows. Although the EU altogether remained the 
largest trading partner for Russia (with 45% of Russian exports going to the EU, around $160 billion 
compared to 11% to China, and 36% of imports coming from the EU, compared to 21% from China, 
according to data from Unctadstat), bilateral trade with China started to get a faster pace in both 
directions, following increasing cooperation and connectivity between the two countries, as well as a 
number of institutional arrangements to foster trade linkages (see below). The structure of Russian 
exports to China progressively changed in favour of energy exports already since the early 2000s, when 
Russia’s dependence on natural resource exports intensified. This is especially true in the case of Russia’s 
exports to China, which increasingly shifted to energy trade, as a result of a growing need by China to 
secure oil supplies, agricultural goods and semi-finished goods on the one hand, and on the other hand 
to benefit from a large neighbouring market for light manufactures such as clothing and apparel, 
footwear, telecom equipment, data processing machines and electrical appliances (Figure 3).  
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Figure 2 Commodity composition of Russian exports to China, 1995 and 2017 (% on total) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from UNCTADStat 
Figure 3 Commodity composition of Russian imports from China, 1995 and 2017 (% on total) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from UNCTADStat 
 
The shift in the Russian structure of trade with China was also the result of an increasing amount of 
Chinese investment in the form of funding of energy projects with Chinese funding and acquisitions of 
stakes in major energy corporations in Russia by Chinese stakeholders. Therefore, Chinese acquisitions 
in the Russian energy sector (over $26.5 billion since 2006, more than half of total Chinese direct 
investment to Russia over the same years, according to data from China Global Investment Tracker 
database by the American Enterprise Institute9) were a chief vehicle in the process of building a 
convergence of interests between Moscow and Beijing on energy cooperation. Such cooperation had 
long been searched for by China, but became a reality only when the Russian government found itself in 
the urgent need for a reliable export market with large availability of funding. This has been chiefly 
expressed as follows: “As Russian resistance to Chinese upstream investments has declined in the 
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aftermath of the post-Ukraine sanctions, Chinese officials have become more interested in opportunities 
in Russia. Xi explained, ‘...we need to help neighbors in times of crisis... .In response, we hope that 
neighboring countries will be well inclined towards us, and we hope that our appeal and our influence 
will grow’ (Xi 2013a: 32710)”.11 Since 2013, China has invested several billion USD to acquire stakes in 
Russian energy companies, with the highest level reached in 2017, when more than $5.7 billion were 
invested in Russian oil and gas activities.12  
As a result of the major energy infrastructure projects that have allowed the transportation of gas and 
electricity towards East Asia, Russia is today’s China's largest source of both crude oil and electricity 
imports and its fifth largest source of coal imports. Energy trade is gaining even more importance, as the 
China-Russia east-route natural gas pipeline is expected to send up to 38 billion cubic meters of gas to 
China each year upon completion planned for 2020. Energy cooperation between the two countries 
gained impressive speed since 2013, and even more in 2014. Due to the sanctions imposed on Russia 
after its invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s energy export industry has been forced to redefine a long-
term strategy, as Europe has starting diversifying its gas suppliers (e.g. in favour of Qatar and the United 
States) to limit the dependence on Russian suppliers. In face of Western economic sanctions to Russia, 
with the support of Chinese funding, Russia launched a landmark Arctic gas project, the Yamal liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) project in Russia's Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic, controlled by Russia’s Novatek.13 
Yamal was a first attempt at tapping the huge hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic and at the same time 
testing the viability of the northern sea route to China.14 Yamal LNG opened its first production line in 
December 2017, with both China National Petroleum Corporation and China's Silk Road Fund owning 
stakes in the project. Yamal LNG will allow shipping gas to China (54% of contracted output, according 
to the Financial Times, in about 15 days, compared to almost twice that time when shipping gas to China 
through Europe and the Suez canal. At least 4 million tonnes of LNG will be shipped to China every 
year after the completion of more production lines. 
Besides gas, oil has also become a major sector of energy cooperation. Chinese investment in Russian oil 
sector have grown rapidly, including a contract, between Russia’s state-owned Gazprom and the China 
National Petroleum Corporation for the construction of a 2,500-mile gas pipeline to China’s Heilongjiang 
province. A further agreement would secure an additional 30 bcm of gas to China’s Xingjiang Province 
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from western Siberia for 30 years. The combined supplies of those pipelines would make China the 
largest customer for Russia, larger than Germany, its current largest customer.  
The early 2000s marked the beginning of growing trade imbalances between the two countries, in the 
form of a rising Russian trade deficit vis-à-vis China, together with reinforcing trade patterns in which 
Russia mainly serves as a supplier of natural resources in exchange for manufactured goods. Oil and gas 
pipelines from Siberia to China has contributed significantly to the progressive pivoting of bilateral trade 
on energy and therefore to the growing interdependence between the two. This was exactly the form of 
trade dependence that former political leaders in Russia had resisted during the 1990s, concerned that 
such a trade pattern would make Russia grow increasingly dependent on natural resources (fuels and 
minerals account for 63% of Russian exports), to the detriment of industrial development. The small 
share of manufactures exported to China (22% of the total) is the result of cooperative agreements in the 
nuclear, aviation, and aerospace industries, according to which Russia has maintained a role of supplier 
of semi-finished machinery and parts of electrical equipment to China. A further area of energy 
cooperation between China and Russia is nuclear energy. The two countries will cooperate on nuclear 
power plant technology development: “both countries have signed nuclear deals with Iran, Egypt, Sudan 
and Turkey, and both have looked to dominate nuclear export markets”. 15  
Russia’s recent pivot to Asia16, and most notably to China, has been considered by some scholars as a 
‘strategic necessity’ “to ameliorate the economic and demographic situation in the Russian Far East and 
Eastern Siberia”17, but also as a broader “opportunity for Russia to break out of the economic, security, 
and geographic traps she finds herself in within the Western-dominated international order” 18. However, 
there are also opposite views that emphasise the detrimental effect that Russia-China deepening 
economic ties might have on the future of Russian industrial development. According to many scholars, 
the bilateral relationship between Russia and China seems an ever-deepening, but at the same time an 
increasingly imbalanced one. A relationship that would perpetuate an imbalance between Russia 
supplying raw materials to China and importing Chinese manufactures. This view suggests that “Russia 
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should shift the focus of its export policy from negotiating politically driven large projects toward more 
intensive promotion of consumer goods exports.”19  
 
However, an interesting alternative perspective on the growing interdependence between Russia and 
China has been recently offered on the claims that both countries suffer from resource vulnerabilities, 
therefore the widespread view that increasing economic interdependence might put Russia in a more 
worrying position vis-à-vis China than the other way around might be partly overstated.20 According to 
this view, “Russia’s fears of becoming China’s resource appendage are more widely discussed than are 
Chinese insecurities about adequate and secure resource supplies”21, but in fact the two countries have 
developed mutual interdependence.22 In particular, China has grown more and more dependent on 
Russia’s resources, namely oil and gas, but also water and timber.23 
Oil and gas dependence and the relative dependence on import routes for energy supplies has been high 
on the policy agenda of Chinese leaders, who have stressed the need to diversify both suppliers and 
import routes. This has made energy cooperation with Russia a high priority for China since the times of 
Hu Jintao. Russia’s position as a major resource supplier to China would compensate the strong 
dependence of Moscow on Chinese demand. As Russia has possibly become the leading oil supplier to 
China in 2018, as well as the leading supplier of gas. 
Water also represents another source of resource vulnerability for China, compared to the abundance of 
renewable water resources available in Russia, precisely at the eastern border with China. The so called 
‘virtual water’, i.e. the water used in production processes, is also a potential source of dependence for 
China on Russia. China is currently the largest importer of Russian timber, and also agricultural 
cooperation has progressed to the extent that China is growing as a larger food net importer and some 
of the goods where tariffs have been levied during the current US-China trade war are agricultural 
products. These forms of resource vulnerability in China make the country equally dependent on her 
suppliers, as the latter are on China being their major export market. 
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Improved connectivity and trade arrangements since the early 2000s 
The intensifying economic linkages between Russia and China since the early 2000s benefited from 
significant progress in alleviating transportation bottlenecks between the two countries, traditionally 
characterised by an important lack of infrastructure acting as a serious impediment to the development 
of trade relations. New border crossings were opened, air and shipping links were increased, new rail 
tracks were built and more communication facilities developed. However, the border between the two 
countries, although over 4100 km long, is characterised by relatively low accessibility; the western section 
runs for more than 4000 km, starting at the eastern China–Mongolia–Russia tripoint until the China-
Russia-North Korea tripoint just a few km before the Pacific Ocean; the much shorter (less than 100 
kilometres) western border section is between Russia's Altai Republic and China's Xinjiang and runs in 
the mostly snow-covered high elevation area of the Altai Mountains until its western end point is the 
China–Kazakhstan–Russia tripoint.  
Due to the difficult geographical features of their common border, Central Asia remains a very important 
region on which China-Russia trade linkages depend, but that region is itself an area with the most severe 
lack of connectivity infrastructure in the world. According to World Bank data, transportation costs for 
many central Asian countries are still extremely high, which makes the price of imported goods for those 
countries much higher than it could be if adequate connectivity was in place. For example, Tajikistan 
currently faces the highest cost in the world to import with over $10,000 per container compared to a 
global average of $1,877.24 Imports are particularly costly also for Uzbekistan, one of the two double-
landlocked countries in the world, i.e. whose neighbouring countries do not have a direct access to the 
sea. 
The combination of the rich resource endowments of Central Asian countries, their growth potential, 
their geographical position as a potential bridge from the eastern part of China to the western part of 
Russia and also from China to Europe (two major trade partners vis-à-vis one another) made Central 
Asia a policy priority in the eyes of Beijing since well before the recent launch of the Belt and Road 
Initiative in 2013. After 2001, a further geo-political motivation added to the above, i.e. the proximity of 
the region to Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq, a potential “arc of instability”.25  
Besides transport connectivity, Russian-Chinese relations benefited from effective bilateral mechanisms 
and agreements with China, and their subsequent institutional development. This major shift in the tenor 
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of Russian-Chinese economic relations was marked by the arrival of Vladimir Putin on the Russian 
political scene, with a more attentive approach to domestic economic interests compared to those of 
Gorbachev in the 1980s. The Putin administration was in favour of the establishment of large-scale high-
technology collaborative projects as a major means to increase trade ties between Russia and China, as 
noted in the 2002 joint communiqué between the heads of government, stating that “work should be 
done to lay a foundation for long-term stability of trade cooperation by increasing the share of high-
technology, mechanical- electrical and other high value added products so as to improve the product mix 
and develop economic ties of advanced forms”26. However, it is precisely during those years that the 
structure of bilateral trade between the two countries started to become rather biased towards Russian 
energy exports in exchange for Chinese manufactures, and cemented Russia’s dependence on energy 
exports. Export concentration increased and along with it also trade disparity, a condition that had been 
long resisted by the previous administration. The economic imbalance with China has deepened, China 
is now Russia’s largest trading partner (although the EU altogether is a much bigger partner than China), 
and the bilateral relation has now become a strategic partnership aimed to counterbalance the United 
States’ global influence.27  
The development of Russia-China trade relations extends well beyond the bilateral linkages to the broader 
range of institutional arrangements at the regional level. Initially, Russia and China have been chief actors 
in a series of cooperation and trade agreements, as both countries had ambitions to govern the trade 
integration process around each of them, competing with each other to expand their respective areas of 
influence among neighbouring countries.   
First and foremost, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, was formed on 1st January 2015. The economic union has a population of 183 
million people and a gross domestic product of more than US$4 trillion, and has been growing at trade 
volume rates of 30 percent per annum. As the EAEU comes right up to the EU border via Belarus, and 
its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and most significantly, Poland, it has the potential to shake up and alter 
European trade flows between the EU and China and possibly to India and ASEAN as well.  
The EAEU may appear at first glance to be a recreation of the old Soviet bloc, as member countries 
show a high degree of complementarity and intra-EAEU trade was up 38% in 2016. However, the region 
is also very much open vis-à-vis external trade flows, unlike in the history of the Soviet bloc. The Eurasian 
Economic Union’s share in world exports is 3.7 per cent, and its share in imports is 2.3 per cent. If it 
were a country, in GDP terms it would be the world’s fourth largest economy, just behind Japan but 
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ahead of Germany. It is for these reasons that numerous countries have applied for Free Trade 
Agreements with the EAEU. Among them are India, Singapore, Iran, and Turkey as part of 40 countries 
currently involved in FTA negotiations. As we will discuss below, the Union has recently signed an FTA 
with China, since the early 2019. Vietnam is currently the only other Asian nation to possess an FTA 
with the EAEU, in a deal that has seen Russian investment into the country rise from close to zero to 
US$10 billion in just two years.  
Mainly considered as Russia’s answer to the EU, at times when the latter started to become a more 
difficult partner due to the beginning of the economic sanctions in 2014, the EAEU should also be 
considered a Russian reaction to the increasingly pushy attitude by China in trying to expand the scope 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), or Shanghai Pact. SCO is a Eurasian political, 
economic and security alliance, the creation of which was announced on 15 June 2001 
in Shanghai, China by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; 
the SCO Charter, formally establishing the organisation, was signed in June 2002 and entered into force 
on 19 September 2003. The original five nations, with the exclusion of Uzbekistan, were previously 
members of the Shanghai Five group, founded on 26 April 1996. Since then, the organisation has 
expanded its membership to eight countries when India and Pakistan joined SCO as full members on 9 
June 2017 at a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. SCO includes some of the most promising countries in 
terms of growth potential in the near future, among the next generation of emerging economies, such as 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moreover, Belarus, Armenia, Vietnam, Iran and Israel are 
considering accession. Today SCO accounts for 21% of global GDP, compared to 22% in the EU.  
A major impetus to China-Russia bilateral ties has been recently given by the series of meetings of the 
Eastern Economic Forum, established by Putin in 2015, held each year in Vladivostok in just four years, 
the EEF has become the biggest international platform for discussing the strategy for developing political, 
economic and cultural ties between Russia and Asia Pacific. Among the major developments the recent 
EAEU-China FTA has the potential of becoming a real game changer not just in regional economic 
relations but also on a global scale, to the extent that, firstly, the FTA includes a number of countries that 
make up a vast majority of the landmass between Asia and Europe, and secondly, overcomes the 
competition between China and Russia to build their own separate sphere of economic and political 
influence in Central Asia.28  
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The agreement which is the first major systematic arrangement ever reached between the two sides, 
covers 13 aspects, including customs cooperation, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights, sectoral 
cooperation and government procurement, as well as e-commerce and competition. The goal is to reduce 
non-tariff trade barriers and promote the in-depth development of China's economic and trade relations 
with the Union and its member states. Russia’s own trade with China is set to hit US$100 billion, and the 
FTA will dramatically enhance this. The Russia-China trade space is growing at a faster rate than China’s 
trade with the EU. Russia is a front runner in trade with China within the Union, accounting for more 
than 85 per cent of exports to China (worth almost USD33bn) and for more than 83 per cent of all 
imports from China to the EAEU (almost USD45bn). Other EAEU member states also run positive 
relations with China (Figure 4), but especially on the investment rather than trade side.  
 
Figure 4  
 
 
Commodity turnover between the EAEU countries and China amounted to more than 100 bln US dollars 
already in 2017. Besides, exports from the EAEU to the PRC raised by 40% in the same year. This shows 
that a significant degree of economic integration already exists between China and the members of the 
EAEU, which suggests that the newly signed FTA will likely be successful in expanding trade between 
member states. However, the current trade structure between EAEU members and China is very similar 
to the one between Russia and China, i.e. it is largely based on primary goods exports from the EAEU 
to China in exchange for manufactures. Increasing trade links with China over the past decade further 
amplified the export concentration of EAEU members, most notably for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia (Figure 5). This is why the Union countries find exports diversification to be of fundamental 
importance as a goal inspiring the sign of the FTA with China.  
Figure 5 Index of export concentration, EAEU members 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from UNCTADStat 
Only in the years 2008-2014 the cumulative Chinese investments in the countries of the Eurasian 
Economic Union more than doubled – from USD11bn to USD27.1bn. Russia is not the main recipient 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the People’s Republic of China, it is Kazakhstan that has the 
highest level of investment cooperation with China – almost 90 per cent of the cumulative FDIs in the 
EAEU according to data from Chinese Investment Tracker. In recent years, however, the value of 
Chinese investments in Russia has also increased. In the run up towards the negotiations to sign an FTA 
between the EAEU and China, Chinese direct investment in Russia soared 72 percent to reach 2.22 
billion dollars in 2017. Chinese contractors signed new projects worth 7.75 billion dollars in Russia in the 
same year, up 191.4 percent, faster growth than that for most countries participating in the Belt and Road 
Initiative. As a result, China is now the largest trade partner and source of foreign investment for the 
Russian Far East. FDIs are generally implemented in the form of long-term loans and invested in the 
mineral and raw materials complex (up to 98 per cent of all investments). However, in recent times, 
Beijing has also been interested in agriculture and has attempted to locate its companies from this sector 
in the countries of the EAEU.  
The China-EAEU FTA is the outcome of a convergence of interests between Russia and China in Central 
Asia and potentially also in Southeast Asia. This convergence represents a major shift in Russian foreign 
policy, to the extent that Moscow’s traditional concerns about the growing Chinese economic and 
commercial activities and interests in Central Asia had been further magnified by the launch of the Silk 
Road Economic Belt (SREB, the land part of the Belt an Road Initiative) in Nursultan (former Astana, 
Kazakhstan) back in 2013. Such a convergence has led to the concept and building of the Greater 
Eurasian Partnership, a great economic space across Europe and Asia, which is the ultimate geopolitical 
ambition of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aiming at uniting Eastern Europe to the Eastern and 
Southern areas of Asia by connecting a number of existing agreements such as the EAEU and the SCO, 
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as well as a number of corridors, such as the Lapis-Lazuli Transit, Trade & Transport Route, the so called 
Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which connects the Caucasus to Central Asia, and Turkey’s Middle Corridor 
Project (East-West Trans-Caspian Trade and Transport Corridor). The former begins from Afghanistan 
close to the Afghani border where rail connections already exist with Turkmenistan. From there, the 
routes continue west to the Caspian Sea Port of Turkmenbashi, in Turkmenistan. After transiting the 
Caspian, the route continues on to Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, and then connects onward to Tblisi, 
capital of Georgia, as well as the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi; finally, the corridor will connect to 
the cities of Kars and Istanbul in Turkey, at the gates of Europe. The current dialogues between the 
EAEU and Iran, India, Indonesia and Singapore witness the ambition to extend the Greater Eurasian 
Partnership until the whole ASEAN, which has already started through the productive FTA the EAEU 
has with Vietnam. 
Besides connecting the major lands of Asia from North to South, from East to West, China has ambitions 
to connect to Europe in a much varied and diversified way compared to the current sea lanes going from 
the Southern ports of China to the South of the Mediterranean. A major geostrategic goal of the BRI 
includes the Chinese plan to ship to Europe via the Northern Passage and the Arctic Ocean, within the 
Russian territory.29 Moreover, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus have primary routing for rail freight 
services to Europe, and new projects of motorway construction and railroad infrastructure are ongoing, 
especially in Kazakhstan which is expected to receive 5 bln US dollars from transit through its territory, 
thereby allowing distributing Chinese goods across the European Rail network as far away as Madrid and 
London. Overall, the China-EAEU FTA accomplishes the Chinese goal to cross the entire Eurasian land 
mass duty free, until the EU’s borders.   
Although the progressive convergence of interests between Russia and China on building a greater 
Eurasian space has included as a chief objective the linking between the Eurasian economic integration30 
and China's strategic Silk Road Economic Belt project, it is worth noticing that the BRI itself has the 
potential to become a source of major friction in Russian-Chinese relations. Although the BRI includes 
a series of trade routes to achieve its goal to ship Chinese exports to Europe, some experts believe that, 
ultimately, the BRI will have to settle on a single route to be economically viable. This suggests that Russia 
is actually competing with other member countries of the EAEU to get the most benefits from its 
participation in the BRI. This is one of the reasons why, despite recent signs of cooperation and 
deepening ties between Russia and China, a ‘serious geopolitical competition’31 remains, according to 
experts including Robert Kaplan of the Centre for a New American Security and Dimitri Trenin, director 
                                               
29 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/14/china-we-are-a-near-arctic-state-and-we-want-a-polar-silk-road.html 
30 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/central-asia-a-new-hub-of-global-integration/ 
31 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-russia-ties--more-rivalry-than-allaince.html . 
of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Currently, one of the main routes preferred by Moscow is the so called 
“northern” route relying heavily on Russia’s trans-Siberian railway system, but preliminary studies32 show 
that a central route - an expanded and improved rail network from China’s western Xinjiang Province 
and the Central Asian states, bypassing Russia – has become considerably more time- and cost-effective 
than the trans-Siberian route. This is a source of concerns for Russian leadership, to the extent that they 
are linking the country more and more to Asia and even more to China, with a high degree of uncertainty 
about the net economic benefits for the domestic economy. Partly to compensate for the need to foster 
production diversification and industrial development, cooperation between China and Russia has 
recently gained a new momentum, including a joint venture set up in 2017 to build wide-body long-haul 
passenger jets, a research and development center on high-speed rail technology last year, the field 
investigation and design of the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway, and further cooperation in such areas 
as nuclear power, aerospace, digital economy, and cross-border e-commerce.  
Implications for the EU 
While discussions about a number of internal issues have dominated the debate in Europe, the economic 
and geopolitical implications of a deepening cooperation between Russia and China has been too long 
neglected, despite the potential huge impact of that on the future of the EU. European politicians have 
invariable underestimated the EAEU as an entity capable of exerting economic influence in the region, 
unlike many Asian countries who expressed an interest in starting negotiations to join or already joined 
the Union.   
As a matter of fact, a joint initiative, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), was inaugurated by the European 
Union in Prague, Czech Republic, back in 2009 by the European External Action Service of the EU 
together with its Member States and six Eastern European Partners to govern its relationship with 
the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, with the ultimate 
aim of building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability, and increased cooperation. The 
EaP has provided an avenue for discussions of trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other 
issues between the EU and its Eastern European neighbours.  
Possibly even more important than the increasing competition around the EU borders, a major 
implication of a growing integration across Eurasia is a rising competition between the two major Unions 
– the EU and the EAEU – for new member countries.  Recently, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have 
been offered by both the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union to join their integration 
unions. All three countries opted for the European Union by signing association agreements on 21 March 
2014. However, break-away regions of Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk) and 
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Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) have expressed a desire to join the Eurasian Customs Union and 
integrate into the Eurasian Economic Union. 
 
Especially during the tensions between Russia and the European Union in 2014, pressures have increased 
by both unions to pressure post-Soviet states to join their integration unions. Both sides have accused 
each other of carving spheres of influence. Members of the union, especially Russia have tried to diversify 
their trade by signing economic agreements with China, Iran and Turkey. Trade with North and South 
Korea has also risen. 
The recent FTA between the EAEU and the People’s Republic of China (EAEU-China FTA) is a 
challenge to the economic position of the EU in the world, because each new economic agreement 
involves trans-border consequences. This is especially true when a free trade zone is created on a territory 
of nearly 30 million square km and with a population of more than 1.5 billion people, which is additionally 
located in the neighbourhood of the EU. The agreement is also an attempt to shift the economic centre 
of gravity in Europe, from the West to the East, and this could lead to the escalation of tensions between 
Brussels and Moscow. In the public, policy and scholarly debate alike, a lot of attention have been given 
disproportionally to the changing routes of international trade between China and Europe. Not just will 
Chinese goods cross the whole of Eurasia without any customs duties being paid, as Chinese goods can 
be sent to any location within the European Union through the main railway route for continental trade 
crossing Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. What’s more, the longest border section separating the two 
blocks is the one between Belarus and Poland, and the main railway line connecting Berlin and Moscow, 
as well as the European E-30 route, are located here. As in the areas surrounding all the other border 
crossing points between the EU and the EAEU in Lithuania and Latvia one can expect a rapid 
development of Chinese infrastructure investments, EU producers, especially from SMEs, are likely to 
face increasing competition in the new reality of trade with the East.  
One of the cases where competition between the EU and the EAEU was not effective is bringing about 
a beneficial solution for the third countries seeking to join either one or the other Union is Armenia. 
Included in the EaP, EU membership would probably enable faster social and economic development in 
the country, compared to the EAEU, where Armenia is not highly integrated and is actually piling up 
increasing economic dependence on China.  
Among the main implication of the EAEU-China FTA is likely to be a change in the traditional axes of 
cooperation between Russia (and the EAEU) and the European Union. The implications of the growing 
cooperation in Eurasia may impact on the strategic agreements of Moscow and Berlin concerning the 
energy sector, but also on the EU as a whole, who could be forced to accept the new economic status 
quo in the region of Eastern Europe and Asia.  
Against the backdrop of the United Kingdom leaving the EU and its enlargement eastward coming to a 
standstill, the EU should consider deepening its neighbourhood policy through a Wider European 
Economic Area (WEEA). 33 Among other essential elements to increase linkages, free trade should be 
regarded as the first priority in his WEEA initiative, which embraces non-EU members such as Norway 
and Switzerland, the Balkans and those in East Europe which have association agreements with the EU. 
The WEEA could become a framework whereby the EU could develop coordination with the EAEU 
and China’s BRI. This view has become particularly relevant given the rapid enlargement of an area of 
broader economic and political influence by China in Europe, including the recent joining the 16+1 
initiative by Greece and the signing of a series of Memorandum of Understanding between the PRC and 
some EU member states beyond those in the Central and Eastern regions of the Union, such as Portugal, 
Italy and Luxembourg.  
                                               
33 As suggested by Michael Emerson, of the Brussels think tank Centre for European Policy Studies, available at 
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